Is \u3ci\u3eSky Reefer\u3c/i\u3e in Jeopardy? The MLA\u27s Proposed Changes to Maritime Foreign Arbitration Clauses by Jin Lee, Soo Sandra
Washington Law Review 
Volume 72 Number 2 
4-1-1997 
Is Sky Reefer in Jeopardy? The MLA's Proposed Changes to 
Maritime Foreign Arbitration Clauses 
Soo Sandra Jin Lee 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Admiralty Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Soo S. Jin Lee, Notes and Comments, Is Sky Reefer in Jeopardy? The MLA's Proposed Changes to 
Maritime Foreign Arbitration Clauses, 72 Wash. L. Rev. 625 (1997). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol72/iss2/10 
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copytight 0 1997 by Washington Law Review Association
IS SKYREEFER IN JEOPARDY? THE MLA'S
PROPOSED CHANGES TO MARITIME
FOREIGN ARBITRATION CLAUSES
Soo Sandra Jin Lee
Abstract: After almost sixty years of change in the international commercial arena, the
United States needs to revise its maritime law to reflect international practice. Recently, the
U.S. Supreme Court, in Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MIV Sky Reefer, held that
foreign arbitration clauses in maritime bills of lading will be enforced. In an attempt to
reverse this decision, the Maritime Law Association included in its proposal to revise the
Carriage of the Goods by Sea Act a clause that specifically denies the enforcement of
foreign arbitration clauses. This Comment argues that Congress should not adopt the
proposed revision because maritime commerce is not confined within national borders, and
the United States should continue to align its practices with international expectations. In
particular, this Comment asserts that, although as a whole the proposed revision would be
beneficial, the Maritime Law Association should reconsider the issue of enforcing foreign
arbitration clauses in bills of lading.
In June 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court settled a dispute among the
circuit courts when it ruled in Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V
Sky Reefer' that bills of lading containing arbitration clauses do not
lessen a carrier's liability under section 1303(8) of the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)2 and can therefore be enforced. The Court
found that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)3 did not necessarily
preempt COGSA. Responding to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, the
U.S. Maritime Law Association (MLA) offered Congress a proposal to
revise COGSA. This revision, if adopted, would render foreign
arbitration clauses unenforceable in cases involving the discharge or
loading of goods within the United States. If the MLA's proposal is
enacted by Congress, it will override the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Sky Reefer, forcing arbitration and litigation in the United States.
Although the proposed revision would guarantee a continued legal
market for American maritime lawyers, it also would contradict the
international maritime practice of enforcing bills of lading that contain
foreign arbitration clauses.
Historically, maritime trade is not restricted to one country; therefore,
there have been overtures towards harmonizing the maritime practice of
1. 115 S. Ct. 2322 (1995).
2. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315 (1994).
3. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
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all countries. Accordingly, the United States needs to keep adopting
practices of international maritime commerce.
Part I of this Comment discusses the legislative background pertinent
to an understanding of international maritime commerce. Part II focuses
on case law preceding the Sky Reefer decision. It then summarizes the
Sky Reefer facts, explains the rationale, and explores the possible effects
of the holding. The MLA's proposed revision is discussed in Part II,
and Part IV analyzes and critiques the reasons for and objections to an
enactment of the proposal. Finally, this Comment concludes by
recommending that any revisions to COGSA be consistent with the Sky
Reefer decision.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE BACKDROP: DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL RULES GOVERNING CARRIAGE OF
GOODS BY SEA
A. Domestic Rules: The Harter Act and the Carriage oj'Goods by Sea
Act
In the late 1800s, U.S. courts applied common law principles to
evaluate bills of lading.4 Bills of lading, which regulate transactions
between a carrier and shipper, have three functions: -they act as "a
receipt, a contract of carriage' and a document of title."'5 Under common
law, bills of lading included unreasonable exceptions for negligence.6
Consequently, Congress enacted the Harter Act in 18937 in an attempt to
limit the negligence exceptions that private carriers were including in
bills of lading to escape liability.8
4. See Knott v. Botany Mills, 179 U.S. 69, 71-72 (1900) (determining that prior to enactment of
Harter Act, exemptions permitted in contract of carriage); Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black Jr.,
The Law ofAdmiralty § 3-23 (2d ed. 1975).
5. See William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims 6 (2d ed. 1978).
6. See, e.g., Liverpool & Great W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 1197, 453, 458 (1889)
(holding that bill of lading clause exempted carrier from liability for negligence caused by its
servants); see also C.A. Seguros Orinoco v. Naviera Transpapel C.A., 677 F. Supp. 675, 681
(D.P.R 1988) (before enactment of Harter Act, carriers stipulated numerous exceptions for liability
to cargo damage); H.R. Rep. No. 52-1988, at 2-3 (1892) (prohibiting carriers from inserting certain
provisions into bills of lading).
7. 46 U.S.C. app. § 190 (1994).
8. The Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce noted that "an imperative duty rests
upon Congress to pass such legislation as may be necessary to remove from trade all unnecessary
burdens and restrictions." Kenneth M. Klemm, Comment, Forum Selection in Maritime Bills of
Lading Under COGSA, 12 Fordham Int'l L.J. 459,462 n.18 (1989).
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The Harter Act represented a compromise more than a crackdown on
"unfair" negligence exceptions in bills of lading.9 It allowed many
exemptions from liability for cargo loss or damage, such as damages
resulting from errors in navigation or management of the vessel, acts of
God, public enemy attacks, inherent defect or vice of the object being
carried, necessity to save the ship, and negligent packaging on the part
of the shipper. ° In addition, it also left intact the carrier's traditional
freedom from liability from fires not caused by the carrier's design or
neglect." In contrast, however, the Act prohibited exculpatory clauses
that relieved carriers from liability for damage caused by negligence in
loading, stowing, or discharging goods, 2 or due diligence in equipping
the vessels in order to make them seaworthy. 3 Ultimately, the Act struck
a balance between the interests of shipowners and owners of goods. For
example, where a shipowner provided an unseaworthy ship, the
shipowner was liable for any cargo damage. In instances where the
shipowner provided a seaworthy vessel and cargo was damaged due to
unforeseen causes, however, the shipowner would not be liable because
the owner had original control over the goods in the cargo containers.
The Harter Act represented:
[M]ore that a decade of groping from the formula which would express in a satisfactory
manner the desired distinction between faults which a shipowner should be forbidden to avoid
by contract, and faults (consisting of errors of judgment and carelessness during the voyage),
as to which he should be allowed exoneration ....
9. See Gilmore & Black, supra note 4, § 3-24, at 143.
10. The Harter Act provides:
Limitation of liability for errors of navigation, dangers of the sea and acts of God. If the owner
of any vessel transporting merchandise of property to or from any port in the United States of
America shall exercise due diligence to make the said vessel in all respects seaworthy and
properly manned, equipped, and supplied, neither the vessel, her owner or owners, agent, or
charterers, shall become or be held responsible for damage or loss resulting from faults or
errors in navigation or in the management of said vessel nor shall the vessel, her owner or
owners, charterers, agent, or master be held liable for losses arising from dangers of the sea or
other navigable waters, acts of God, or public enemies, or the inherent defect, quality, or vice
of the thing carried, or from insufficiency of package, or seizure under legal process, or for loss
resulting from any act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods, his agent or
representative, or from saving or attempting to save life or property at sea, or from any
deviation in rendering such service.
46 U.S.C. app. § 192 (1994).
11. 46 U.S.C. app. § 182(1994).
12. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 190 (1994).
13. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 191 (1994).
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In 1936, Congress passed the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 4 to
supplement the Harter Act. COGSA defined the rights and liabilities of
carriers and shippers in foreign commerce that either loaded or
discharged goods in U.S. ports. 5 It was enacted for the same reasons as
the Harter Act: American carriers, displeased because they were
absolutely liable for damages from unseaworthiness, 6 pushed for
legislation that enabled them to contract out of these liabilities via bills
of lading.
COGSA places certain limitations on the ability of the carrier to
exempt itself from liability.17 In particular, section 1303(8) prohibits any
clause that reduces a carrier's liability:
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage
relieving the carrier or the ship from liability for loss or
damage... arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties
and obligations provided in this section, or lessening such liability
otherwise than as provided in this chapter, shall be null and void
and of no effect. 8
Section 1303(8) does not specify which clauses lessen a carrier's
liability; currently, only clauses regarding location of storage 9 and trade
customs" are prohibited.
B. International Rules: The Hague Rules and the Hamburg Rules
The passage of the Harter Act prompted other coun.tries to protect
their shippers through similar legislation.2' This birth of carrier-shipper
standards created a lack of uniformity, compelling the International Law
14. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, ch. 229, Pub. L. No. 74-521, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936) (codified
as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315 (1994)).
15. See H.R. Rep. No. 74-2218, at 7-8 (1936).
16. See Horn v. Cia de Navegacion Frueco, S.A., 404 F.2d 422,432 (5th Cir. 1968). In this case,
a claim was brought against an owner whose vessel was under a charter party, for cargo damage
caused by improper stowage. The court stated that, under the Harter Act, an owner whose vessel
does not meet the seaworthiness standard is liable for cargo damage regardless of whether the
defect and the disaster are related. Id at 432.
17. See 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1303-1304 (1994).
18. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(8).
19. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 14-16 (2d Cir.
1969).
20. See Sun Oil Co. v. M/T Carisle, 771 F.2d 805, 814-15 (3d Cir. 1985).
21. See Klemm, supra note 8, at 465 n.36.
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Association,' through its subgroup, the Comite Maritime International
(CMI),s to draft the Hague Rules.24
The Hague Rules were internationally adopted in 1924. Although
later revised as the Hague-Visby Rules,2 the United States only ratified
the original Rules on May 26, 1937.26 The Hague Rules are a set of
international compromises based on the Harter Act27 and apply from the
time goods are loaded on to a ship until the time the goods are
discharged from the ship.28 The first compromise reduced a carrier's
obligation to make a ship seaworthy.29 The Hague Rules only require
that carriers exercise minimal due diligence in making a ship
seaworthy." Second, except for negligence in navigation, management,
or in causing a fire on board, carriers must safely transport the goods
aboard the vessel.3 The Hague Rules limit a carrier's liability to one
hundred English pounds per package. By limiting liability, the Rules
protect cargo owners from liability-limiting clauses in bills of lading and
carriers from having to compensate cargo owners for small packages
containing extremely valuable goods.3
The Hague Rules were intended to create an international, standard
bill of lading while allowing shippers and carriers to exercise freedom of
contract in unregulated areas.3 ' For example, article 3(8) of the Rules,
22. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 9-7, at 294 (1987).
23. See Comite Maritime International, International Conventions on Maritime Law (1987). The
CMI is a private organization that includes the national maritime law associations of about 41
countries. These countries include the United States, Canada, Japan, India, Australia, New Zealand,
and most of the maritime countries of Europe and some of Latin America. See Nicholas J. Healy &
David J. Sharpe, Admiralty Cases and Materials 331 n. 11 (2d ed. 1986).
24. Bill of Lading Convention, opened for signature Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931
(entered into force for United States, Dec. 29, 1937) [hereinafter Hague Rules].
25. Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
Relating to Bills of Lading ("Visby Amendments"), Feb. 23, 1968, (entered into force June 23,
1977), reprinted in 6 Michael F. Sturley, Benedict on Admiralty doe. 1-2, at 1-25 (rev. 7th ed.
1993).
26. Hague Rules, supra note 24, 51 Stat. at 269-74, T.S. No. 931, at 35-49.
27. See Anthony Diamond, Responsibility for Loss of or Damage to, Cargo on a Sea Transit:
The Hague or Hamburg Conventions?, in Carriage of Goods by Sea 110 (Peter Koh Soon Kwang
ed., 1986).
28. See Tetley, supra note 5, at 10. "'Tackle to tackle' means when ship's tackle is hooked on,
or, if shore tackle is being used, when goods cross the ship's side." Id.
29. See Diamond, supra note 27, at 110.
30. Id
31. lad at 111.
32 Id
33. Ia
34. See Schoenbaum, supra note 22, § 9-7, at 294-95.
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like COGSA, prohibits clauses that reduce carriers' liability35 but allows
countries to decide whether it is within their public interest to enforce
arbitration clauses.36 The Rules however, did not s.,ecify whether
arbitration clauses should be enforced because arbitration is a procedural
matter subject to national discretion.3" Moreover, countries would
probably not have ratified a set of rules that imposed on their national
legal procedures.
In an attempt to replace the Hague Rules," the United Nations
Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea enacted the Hamburg
Rules of 1978.'9 The Hague Rules were believed to place an undue
burden on a cargo owner.4" As a result, the Hamburg Rules focused on
the cargo owner." Also, an important distinction from the Hague Rules
is that the Hamburg Rules specify terms of jurisdiction and arbitration.42
In particular, article 22 of the Hamburg Rules regulates arbitration
clauses by specifying the format, forum, and applicable rules to operate
35. Hague Rules, supra note 24, art. 3(8), 51 Stat. at 240, T.S. No. 931, at 15. Article 3(8) of the
Hague Rules states:
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the ship
from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with goods arising from negligence, fault,
or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this article, or lessening such liability
otherwise than as provided in this convention, shall be null and void and of ao effect. A benefit
of insurance in favor of the carrier or similar clause shall be deemed to bo a clause relieving
the carrier from liability.
Id.; see also 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(8) (1994).
36. See William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims 589 (3d ed. 1988).
37. See Tetley, supra note 5, at 295.
38. See Diamond, supra note 27, at 115.
39. United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Mar. 31, 1978 [hereinafter
Hamburg Rules], reprinted in 6 Sturley, supra note 25, doe. 1-3, at 1-32.6. Only 22 countries have
ratified the Hamburg Rules, and none of them are major maritime players such as the United States,
England, or Japan. Fora detailed history of the development of these rules, see Joseph C. Sweeney,
The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea, 7 J. Mar. L. & Com. 69 (1975).
40. See Diamond, supra note 27, at 116. On a grander scale, this burden translated into the
transfer of wealth from cargo countries to carrier countries. Id. Two of the United Nations agencies,
UNCTAD and UNCITRAL were involved in a 10-year investigation of the effectiveness of the
Hague Rules and the possibility of creating another international maritime convention on
regulating bills of lading. Id at 115. In these investigations, the agencies allege that cargo countries
included developing countries. Id. at 116. The fact that the Hague Rules were initiated by the
United Kingdom, which at that time was the strongest carrier country in the w:rld, and the fact that
the Hague Rules seem to disfavor cargo countries, seem to demonstrate why the U.N. agencies
were so critical of the Hague Rules. Id. at 110, 115. The term "cargo countries" refers to countries
that are primarily involved in producing and exporting the goods whereas the term "carrier
countries" refers to countries that are primarily involved in shipping the goods.
41. Id. at 116.
42. See Hamburg Rules, supra note 39, arts. 21-22.
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on the arbitration.43 In essence, article 22 merely codifies the practice
already in existence under the Hague Rules.
As previously mentioned, since the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act was
enacted in 1936, Congress has neither updated COGSA nor ratified nor
acceded to either the Hamburg Rules or the Hague-Visby Rules.' In the
United States, conflicting interests between carriers and cargo owners
have prevented the ratification of either the Hamburg or the Hague-
Visby Rules.45 Both interest groups however, agree that the existing
rules need to be updated.4
C. The Federal Arbitration Act and the United Nations Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign Arbitral Awards.
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)" to ensure the
recognition and enforcement of arbitration. The FAA serves two
purposes. First, it reverses the long standing hostility that U.S. courts
have harbored towards arbitration agreements.48 Second, it gives
arbitration agreements the same level of importance as other contracts.
49
Chapter 1, section 1 defines maritime transactions as "charter parties,
bills of lading of water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage," or any
other matters in foreign commerce that are subject to admiralty
jurisdiction." Specifically, section 2 applies to maritime law and
provides that:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing. . an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract . . . shall be
43. Id. art. 22.
44. By 1984, only Hungary, Egypt, Uganda, Tanzania, Tunisia, Barbados, Morocco, Rumania,
Chile, and Lebanon had ratified the Hamburg Rules. Belgium, Denmark, Poland, Ecuador,
Singapore, Egypt, Sri Lanka, France, Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, Lebanon, Netherlands,
Spain, Syria, Norway, Tonga, and the United Kingdom had ratified or acceded to the Hague-Visby
Rules. See Diamond, supra note 27, at 113, 116.
45. Maritime Law Ass'n, Revising the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act: Final Report of the Ad
Hoc Liability Rules Study Group as Revised by the Ad Hoc Review Committee 3 (1996) (on file
with Washington Law Review).
46. Id.
47. 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1994)).
48. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4
(1974).
49. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
50. See 9 U.S.C. § I.
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valid, irrevocable, and 'enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation any contract."
Section 2 reflects Congress's intent to favor a liberal federal arbitration
policy, notwithstanding contrary state procedural or substantive
arbitration law. 2 Thus, the purpose of this section is to ensure that one
federal substantive law will encompass all arbitration agreements that
fall within this act.' Section 201 in chapter 2 states that foreign arbitral
awards shall be recognized and enforced in the United States. 4
Similarly, chapter 3, section 301 requires recognition and enforcement
of international commercial arbitration."
On the international level, the United States signed the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention") on December 29, 1970.56
The New York Convention requires that all contracting states recognize
and enforce each other's arbitral awards.57 It also limits the defenses
contracting countries may raise in order to oppose an arbitral award.5
Article 1(1) is of specific importance because it states:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbiation all or
any differences which have arisen or which may arise between
them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual
or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration. 9
Therefore, one of the New York Convention's main purpose is to
prevent and eliminate unnecessary litigation following arbitration.
51. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
52. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
53. Id.
54. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
55. 9 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
56. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,
21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 [hereinafter New York Convention). As of 1994, 101 countries
have ratified and acceded to the New York Convention. See William K. Slate II, International
Arbitration: Do Institutions Make a Difference?, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 41, 44 (1996).
57. See Slate II, supra note 56, at 44.
58. Idt
59. New York Convention, supra note 56, art. 11(l), 21 U.S.T. at 2519.
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II. CASE LAW
Beyond the legislative backdrop, maritime arbitration and forum
selection clauses are also governed by a history of case law. Because
COGSA section 1303(8) does not explicitly state whether enforcing a
bill of lading's forum selection or arbitration clauses lessens a carrier's
liability," case law in this area conflicts. In MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co.,6  the U.S. Supreme Court held that reasonable foreign forum
selection clauses in bills of lading should be enforced.62 Although many
courts enforce foreign forum selection clauses, the same approach has
not been applied to foreign arbitration clauses in bills of lading. Some
courts have held that arbitration clauses should be enforced, yet others
hold that these clauses should be invalid per se.63
A. Forum Selection Clauses
In MIS Bremen, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that forum
selection clauses in bills of lading could be valid depending on the
circumstances of each case. Although this case was not governed by
COGSA, the Court stated that forum selection clauses should be
accepted as a general policy unless the party involved could demonstrate
with certainty that the choice of forum was unreasonable.' 4
In Bremen, the Court justified its holding by acknowledging several
factors. The Court noted that the voyage was lengthy.6" Consequently,
the issue of jurisdiction would have been complicated because an
incident giving rise to a legal claim had the potential of occurring at any
point during the voyage.6 Thus, eliminating the uncertainty of a
potential forum and pre-establishing a forum for litigation was not
unreasonable.' In addition, the Court found that the predictability of a
60. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(8) (1994).
61. 407 U.S. I (1972).
62. Ie at 9-10.
63. See, e.g., Citrus Mktg. Bd. of Israel v. MN Ecuadorian Reefer, 754 F. Supp. 229 (D. Mass.
1990) (holding that COGSA did not invalidate arbitration clauses), overruled by Vimar Seguros y
Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322 (1995); Organes Enter., Inc. v. M/J Khalij
Frost, No. 88 Civ. 4710, 1989 WL 37660, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1989) (finding that arbitration
clauses in bills of lading regulated by COGSA are unenforceable per se), overruled by Vinar
Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322 (1995).
64. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12-15.




forum was crucial to a maritime contract and an integral part of
international business.68
As a result, the Court established the precedent for enforcing foreign
forum selection clauses that had been freely negotiated by both parties.69
The Court reasoned that it would not be responsible for placing a heavy
burden on the future development of the United States' dealings in
international commerce by insisting that all disputes be resolved by the
U.S. legal system.7" The Court further stated that restricting maritime
litigation to the United States clashed with both the need to unburden
overloaded courts and the need to recognize that businesses operate both
locally and in world markets.71
Nearly twenty years later, the Court ruled on the enforceability of
adhesive forum selection clauses not governed by COGSA, which are
clauses that are not freely negotiated by the parties. In Carnival Cruise
Lines Inc. v. Shute,72 the Court upheld the enforceability of a forum
selection clause written on a passenger ticket.73 The clause required
passengers to litigate all claims in Florida.74 The Court rejected the
argument that enforcing adhesive forum selection clauses contradicted
Bremen -by listing several reasons to support its position. First, a
company such as "a cruise line has a special interest in limiting the fora
in which it could be subject to suit."'75 Second, the forum selection clause
spares the costs to the parties involved and the courts of pretrial motions
for change of venue.76 Third, as a consequence of' sparing costs,
customers enjoy a reduced price in their passage tickets.77 Last, the
Court stated that the selected forum, Florida, provided a "court of
competent jurisdiction"'78 consistent with the Limitation of Vessel
Owner's Liability Act (Limitation Act)79 and traveling to Florida would
not lessen a claimant's rights to a trial.80
68. Id. at 13-14.
69. d at 11-12.
70. Id. at 8-9.
71. Id. at 12.
72. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
73. Id. at 596-97.
74. Id. at 587-88.
75. Id at 593.
76. Id at 593-94.
77. Id. at 594.
78. Id at 596.
79. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-196 (1994).
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The first case to address the validity of forum selection clauses in
bills of lading governed by COGSA was Indussa Corp. v. S.S.
Ranborg8 In Indussa, the Second Circuit held that COGSA section
1303(8) invalidated forum selection clauses because such clauses
lessened the carrier's liability. 2 In Indussa, the bill of lading defined the
carrier's principal place of business, Norway, as the forum for all
dispute settlements. 83 Thus, the court reasoned that although a foreign
country may apply COGSA or similar legislation-such as the Hague
Rules-there was no guarantee that the foreign court would interpret the
law in the same manner as U.S. courts.84
B. Arbitration Clauses
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has spoken on the enforceability of
forum selection clauses in bills of lading, lower courts disagree on the
validity of arbitration clauses despite their similarity to forum selection
Section 183c of the Limitation Act states:
It shall be unlawful for the ... owner of any vessel transporting passengers between ports of
the United States or between any such port and a foreign port to insert in any ... contract
... any provision or limitation (1) purporting, in the event of loss of life or bodily injury
arising from the negligence or fault of such owner or his servants, to relieve such owner
... from liability, or from liability beyond any stipulated amount, for such loss or injury, or (2)
purporting in such event to lessen, weaken, or avoid the right of any claimant to a trial by court
of competent jurisdiction on the question of liability for such loss or injury, or the measure of
damages therefor. All such provisions or limitations contained in any such ... contract ... are
declared to be against public policy and shall be null and void and of no effect.
46 U.S.C. app. § 183c.
80. Shute, 499 U.S. at 596.
81. 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967), overruled by Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky
Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322 (1995).
82. Id. at 203-04.
83. M at 201.
84. Id. at 203. Since the Second Circuit's decision, forum selection clauses have generally been
invalidated by other courts. For example, relying on the Second Circuit, the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits have invalidated forum selection clauses per se. See Conklin Garrett, Ltd. v. M/V
Finnrose, 826 F.2d 1441 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that although foreign forum selection clause
established Finland as litigation forum, under COGSA district court should have retained subject
matter jurisdiction over suit), overruled by Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MN Sky Reefer,
115 S. Ct. 2322 (1995); Union Ins. Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir.
198 1) (holding that "despite clause in bill of lading requiring litigation of suit in German court,"
where the bill was "not agreed to through hard bargaining," suit would be litigated in United
States), overruled by Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, SA. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322
(1995).
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clauses.8 5 One reason for such differential treatment is section 2 of the
FAA.86 In Indussa, the court limited its decision to forum selection
clauses and excluded arbitration clauses.17 The court stated that although
the FAA, "adopted in 1925 ... validated a written arbitration provision
'in any Maritime transaction'... and defined that phrase to include 'bills
of lading of water carriers'. . . COGSA, enacted in 1936 ... made no
reference to that form of procedure." 8 Therefore, in dictum, the court
noted that because the FAA was supplemented after COGSA, the FAA
should prevail as controlling law. 9
In Citrus Marketing Board of Israel v. M/V Ecuadorian Reefer,"° the
U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that COGSA
did not invalidate arbitration clauses per se.91 Given the U.S. Supreme
Court's inclination towards favoring forum selection clauses92 as well as
Congress's enactment of the FAA, the Ecuadorian Reefer court decided
that arbitration clauses controlled by COGSA should be upheld.93 The
court reasoned that the FAA was sufficient to determine the validity of
arbitration clauses regardless of whether COGSA governed the bills of
lading.'
In contrast, other courts refuse to enforce arbitration clauses. In State
Establishment for Agricultural Product Trading v. M/V Wesermunde,"
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a clause mandating
arbitration in London, England, violated COGSA because: it lessened the
carrier's liability.' In this case, the parties incorporated COGSA by
contract because COGSA did not apply by its own fore." The Eleventh
Circuit relied on Indussa to support its decision but disregarded the
85. Arbitration clauses clarify which laws and procedures shall regulate the bills of lading. See
Lars Gorton et al, Shipbroking and Chartering Practice 155 (3d ed. 1990).
86. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
87. See Indussa, 377 F.2d 200.
88. Id. at 204 n.4.
89. Id.
90. 754 F. Supp. 229 (D. Mass. 1990).
91. Id. at 234.
92. See supra notes 64 and 73.
93. Ecuadorian Reefer, 754 F. Supp. at 233-34.
94. Id.
95. 838 F.2d 1576 (1 lth Cir. 1988), overruled by Vimar Seguros y Reasegu-os, S.A. v. MN Sky
Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322 (1995).
96. Id. at 1581-82.
97. Id. at 1582.
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Indussa court's note restricting its holding to forum selection clauses
and excluding arbitration clauses.98
In Organes Enterprises, Inc. v. M/V Khalij Frost,99 the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York, although agreeing with the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Wesermunde, held that arbitration clauses
in bills of lading regulated by COGSA were strictly unenforceable."°°
Although the court noted Indussa's disclaimer, °1 it decided that the
FAA did not pertain to arbitration clauses in bills of lading governed by
COGSA.102 The Khalij Frost court preferred such a sweeping decision
because analyzing arbitration clauses case-by-case would defeat the
purposes of COGSA either to achieve simplicity or uniformity.' 3
Although lower courts have taken different approaches to forum and
arbitration clauses in bills of lading governed by COGSA, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that foreign arbitration clauses are enforceable
in cases where the clauses were not found in bills of lading nor governed
by COGSA." In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,' Alberto-Culver sued
Scherk for violating section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934."° Relying on the foreign arbitration clause in the contract, Scherk
moved to stay the proceedings or to dismiss the suit.'0 7 Reversing the
court of appeals, the Court held that it would violate public policy not to
enforce arbitration clauses in well-negotiated private international
commercial contracts. 8 The Court also stated that the Securities
Exchange Act did not invalidate arbitration clauses. 9 In its reasoning,
the Court relied on Bremen even though that case addressed forum
selection clauses and not arbitration clauses."0 The Court explained,
98. Id. at 1581 (citing Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (1967), but disregarding
Indussa, 377 F.2d at 204 n.4).
99. No. 88 Civ. 4710, 1989 WL 37660 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1989).
100. Id at *4.
101. Id at *3.
102 Id. at *5.
103. Id.
104. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Scherk
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
105. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
106. Id at 509. The Securities Exchange Act is codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1994).
107. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516 n.9. The clause stated that any dispute arising from the contract
would be subject to arbitration in Paris and the parties agreed that the laws of Illinois would govern
the arbitration. Id at 509.
108. Id. at 516-17.
109. Id. at 513-14.
110. Id. at 518.
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however, that arbitration clauses are closely related to forum selection
clauses.' The Court found that "[a]n agreement to arbitrate before a
specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection
clause that posits not only the situs of the suit but also the procedure to
be used in resolving the dispute." ' Therefore, the Court focused on
supporting international commercial contracts instead of concerning
itself with whether foreign venues would properly interpret and enforce
U.S. law." 3
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 4
another case claiming statutory violation, the Court held that an
arbitration clause establishing Japan as the arbitration forum was valid
and enforceable."' Due to the concerns of "international comity, respect
for the capacities of foreign... tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of
the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution
of disputes," the Court enforced the arbitration clause, regardless of
whether it might have decided otherwise in a domestic context." 6 The
Court recently expanded the enforceability of foreign arbitration clauses
from clauses found in privately negotiated internatioral commercial
contracts to those found in standard bills of lading; governed by
COGSA.
17
C. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer
1. Facts
Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer"8 involved a
crushed cargo of oranges aboard a ship en route from Morocco to
Massachusetts." 9 Bacchus Associates (Bacchus), a frait wholesaler,
contracted with Galaxie Negoce, S.A. (Galaxie), a fruit supplier, to
purchase a shipload of fruit. 20 Bacchus chartered the ship M/V Sky
111. Id. at 519.
112. Id.
113. Id at 515-19.
114. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
115. Id. at 617, 640.
116. Id. at 629.
117. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322 (1995).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2325.
120. Id.
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Reefer to transport the fruit from Morocco to Massachusetts.12' The
owner of the ship was M.H. Martima, S.A. (Martima), but the vessel was
time-chartered to Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd. (Nichiro).'2 After
receiving the cargo from Galaxie, Nichiro issued Galaxie a form bill of
lading." According to the letter of credit, Galaxie tendered the bill of
lading to Bacchus. 24 Once the cargo reached Massachusetts, Bacchus
discovered that the oranges had been crushed, resulting in approximately
one million dollars in damages."z Bacchus' marine cargo insurer, Vimar
Seguros y Reaseguros, paid $733,442.90 in compensation and in turn
became subrogated to Bacchus' rights. 26 Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros
and Bacchus brought an in personam suit against Martima and an in rem
suit against the vessel.'27 In order to compel Bacchus to comply with the
bill of lading's arbitration clause, Martima filed a motion to stay the
proceedings.' The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
granted the motion and ordered the parties to arbitration. The First
Circuit affirmed the district court's order to arbitrate.1
2 1
2. Lower Courts' Holdings and Rationales
The district court held that because of the FAA, the petitioners were
required to arbitrate their claim in Japan even if the arbitration clause
was "adhesive" and not freely contracted by the parties. 3 ° The court also
stated that the arbitration would not lessen the carrier's liability under
121. Id
122 Id.
123. Id. The arbitration clause in the bill of lading stated:
(1) The contract evidenced by or contained in this Bill of lading shall be governed by the
Japanese law.
(2) Any dispute arising from this Bill of Lading shall be referred to arbitration in Tokyo by the
Tokyo Maritime Arbitration Commission... and the award given by the arbitrators shall be







129. Id at 2326.
130. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MN Sky Reefer, No. Civ. A. 91-13345WF, 1993 WL
137483, at *3 (D. Mass. Apr. 19, 1993), aff'd, 29 F.3d 727 (1st Cir. 1994), aftd, 115 S. Ct. 2322
(1995).
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COGSA section 1303(8).' At the petitioner's request, however, it
certified for interlocutory appeal the issue of whether section 1303(8) of
COGSA prevented the enforcement of arbitration clauses in bills of
lading.
1 32
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision. 33 The court of appeals, instead of focusing on
whether foreign arbitration clauses lessened carriers' liability under
COGSA, stated that section 1303(8) of COGSA did not render
arbitration clauses unenforceable because the FAA was the controlling
statute.13 4 According to the court, the FAA prevailed over COGSA
because it was reenacted eleven years after COGSA was enacted. 35 The
court said that, in general, when two statutes conflict the most recently
enacted statute takes precedence over the previously enacted statute.
36
In addition, a statute containing specific language supersedes a statute
containing general language. 137 Furthermore, the court noted that
COGSA section 1303(8) does not particularly mention forum selection
or arbitration clauses.'38 The FAA, on the other hand, specifically
addresses the enforceability of arbitration clauses in marine bills of
lading.139 Therefore, the court held that the arbitration clause in the bill
of lading was enforceable and accepted the FAA as the controlling
statute.40 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.'
3. The Majority Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's decision but
declined to follow its analysis. 42 Instead of focusing on the potential
131. Id. at *2. This provision was enacted in order to protect shippers from carriers who
presumably have a superior bargaining power. See Gilmore & Black, supra note 4, § 3-25, at 145-
47.
132. SkyReefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2326.
133. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MN Sky Reefer, 29 F.3d 727, 728 (1st Cir. 1994),
affld, 115 S. Ct. 2322 (1995).
134. Id. at 730-31.






141. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 571 (1994).
142. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2324 (1995).
Justice Kennedy authored the opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia,
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conflict between COGSA and the FAA, the Court attempted to
harmonize both statutes. 43 In order to accommodate both statutes, the
Court answered two questions: (1) whether under COGSA, a foreign
arbitration clause in a bill of lading lessens a carrier's liability;'" and (2)
whether foreign arbitrators will apply COGSA
45
The Court answered the first and most important question by holding
that, when examined closely, COGSA section 1303(8) does not
invalidate foreign arbitration clauses. 14' The Court provided four
justifications for its holding. First, the Court stated that COGSA should
be read as drawing a distinction between substantive and procedural
rights. 47 The Court explained that COGSA section 1303(8) protects
cargo owners from being subject to clauses that diminish their
substantial legal rights. 48 Therefore, procedural matters that may
encumber a cargo owner are not regarded as lessening a carrier's
liability because a cargo owner's substantial rights are still intact.
Second, the Court relied on its previous decision in Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute,' where the Court held that forum selection clauses
do not infiinge upon a claimant's substantial rights to a trial by court
according to section 183 of the Limitation Act, 50 which is analogous to
COGSA section 1303(8). Third, the Court stated that countries that
follow the Hague Rules enforce foreign arbitration clauses in bills of
lading.' Therefore, to keep in harmony with international practices, the
United States should also enforce foreign arbitration clauses. Fourth, the
Court stressed the need to heed Congress's enactment of the FAA, which
requires the acknowledgment of arbitration clauses.' As to the second
question, the Court answered that it would be premature to establish
whether a Japanese arbitrator would apply COGSA or not and whether,
as a result, petitioner would receive less protection.'
Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Justice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, and Justice Breyer did not take part in the decision.
143. Id. at 2326, 2330.
144. Id. at 2326-29.
145. Id. at 2329-30.
146. Id. at 2326-29.
147. Id at 2327.
148. Id
149. 499 U.S. 585 (1991); see also Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2327.
150. Shute, 499 U.S. at 596 (discussing 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c); see also supra note 79.
151. Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2328.
152. Id. at 2329.
153. Id. at 2329-30.
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4. Justice Stevens 's Dissent
Justice Stevens preferred to adopt a traditional view of the law and
characterized the majority's opinion as "overzealous.""SA He dismissed
the majority's decision with three points. First, Justice Stevens noted
that the original purpose of COGSA was to place cargo owners on the
same footing as carriers, and the majority's interpretation of COGSA
completely undermines this purpose.'55 Second, the majority's reliance
on Shute was misplaced because that case did not involve COGSA and it
involved a domestic forum selection clause.'56 Third, Justice Stevens
stated that, although the United States has international obligations,
these obligations should not extend to contracts of adhesion.57
Addressing the court of appeals' decision based on the FAA, Justice
Stevens noted that the FAA and COGSA do not conflict. 58 The FAA
provides that where there is no contrary law, arbitration agreements shall
be enforced.'59 According to Justice Stevens, COGSA is the contrary
law.
60
Echoing Justice Stevens's concern for adhering to the original
purpose of COGSA, the MLA proposed a revision of the statute. The
revision, if adopted by Congress, would not only restore the protection
to cargo owners allegedly removed by the Court in Sky Reefer, but
would also increase the level of protection to cargo owners.'
6'
III. MLA'S PROPOSED REVISION OF COGSA
In light of the Sky Reefer decision, the Maritime Law Association
drafted a proposal to revise COGSA, especially section 1303(8). It is
appropriate for the MLA to propose revisions to COGSA, and Congress
should consider this proposal in light of the need for updating the
existing law. Congress should not adopt the MLA's proposed revision
concerning section 1303(8), however, because this revision would
reverse the United States' first logical step towar& international
conformity regarding foreign arbitration clauses as evidenced in the Sky
154. Id. at 2337 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 2334-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 2335 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 2336 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 2336-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
160. Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2337 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. Maritime Law Ass'n, supra note 45, at 41.
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Reefer decision. Instead, COGSA should be modified to clearly state
that foreign arbitration clauses in bills of lading will be enforced.
The MLA proposes to revise of section 1303(8) as follows,
8)(a) Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage
relieving a the carrier or a the ship from liability for loss or damage
to or in connection with the goods, arising from negligence, fault,
or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this section, or
lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in this Act, shall
be null and void and of no effect: Provided, That this subsection
shall not apply to a provision in a service contract, as defined in
section 3(21) of the Shipping Act of 1984, to the extent that the
provision affects only the rights and liabilities of the parties who
entered into the service contract. A benefit of insurance in favor of
a the carrier, or similar clause, shall be deemed to be a clause
relieving a the carrier from liability.
(b) Any clause, covenant, or agreement made before a claim has
arisen that specifies a foreian forum for litigation or arbitration of a
dispute governed by this Act shall be null and void and of no effect
if.
(i) the port of loading or the port of discharge is or was intended
to be in the United States: or
(ii) the place where the goods are received by a carrier or the
place where the goods are delivered to a person authorized to
receive them is or was intended to be in the United States:
provided, however, that if a clause, covenant, or agreement made
before a claim has arisen specifies a foreign forum for arbitration
of a dispute governed by this Act, then a court, on the timely
motion of either party, shall order that arbitration shall proceed in
the United States.'62
The proposed revision changes the reference to "the carrier" to "a
carrier" to ensure that the rights and responsibilities of all parties
involved in the transportation of the goods are governed by the Act.'63
Furthermore, the proposal also stipulates that section 1303(8) shall not
apply to provisions in service contracts."6 A service contract allows
parties with equal bargaining power to reduce the carrier's liability
162. lId app. 2, at 14. The underlined portion is the recommended amendment.
163. Id. app. 1, at 13.
164. Id.
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below what was permitted by COGSA.165 According to the proposed
proviso, however, the reduced liability is binding only to the contracting
parties. A third party taking part in any carrying of the: goods, such as
stevedores or terminal operators, may rely on COGSA for protection.
67
The second paragraph is the most significant addition. Whereas the
original statute was broad and general, this revision explicitly addresses
forum selection and arbitration clauses. 168 The proposed revision renders
any forum selection clause or any foreign arbitration clause
unenforceable in cases where the goods are loaded or discharged-or
intended to be loaded or discharged-in a U.S. port, or if the carrier
receives or delivers-or intended to receive or deliver the goods-in the
United States. 169 In instances where the case is brought to a U.S. court
because of in rem jurisdiction, this provision would not apply. Similarly,
in cases where COGSA is not applicable by its own right, but is
specifically contracted by the parties, this section would not apply
because none of the loading, discharging, receiving, or delivering of the
goods took place in the United States. When the foreign arbitration
clause is held to be unenforceable, the parties may still arbitrate in the
United States. 70 If neither party accepts arbitration in the United States,
then the case will be tried by a U.S. district court without any possibility
of arbitration. '71
This proposed revision to section 1303(8) is not a complete bar to
foreign arbitration clauses. 72 The parties may still decide upon foreign
arbitration after a claim has arisen."u In addition, a cargo owner willing
to consent to foreign arbitration may do so through appropriate
contracting. 74
165. Id. at 39.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 40. Stevedores or terminal operators are employed by cargo owners to transport goods
into a vessel. Generally, they work on the docks and are not considered to be mariners.
168. Id. app. 1, at 14.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE OBJECTIONS TO THE MLA PROPOSAL
There are several compelling reasons for objecting to the MLA
proposal. First, the Sky Reefer decision should not be superseded
because the Court aligned U.S. commercial practices with those of other
main countries. Second, the United States should act in accordance with
general international commercial practices to harmonize and expedite
international proceedings.75 Third, the MLA proposal violates the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention).
A. Sky Reefer Was Correctly Decided
In Sky Reefer, the U.S. Supreme Court correctly held that COGSA
does not render foreign arbitration clauses unenforceable. Also, the
Court appropriately supported its holding with an analysis of the
Carnival Cruise case because of the similarities between COGSA
section 1303(8) and section 183c of the Limitation Act. By comparing
these two statutes, it is apparent that the language in COGSA section
1303(8) "is far less susceptible to an interpretation covering forum
selection clauses" than section 183c of the Limitation Act. 77 Section
183c is divided in two parts. The first part disallows general exculpatory
clauses, and the second part prohibits clauses that specifically lessen a
claimant's right to a trial by court.17 1 The second part could very well be
read as nullifying forum selection clauses because it prohibits any clause
that lessens the rights of the claimant. 79 However, COGSA section
1303(8) is analogous only to the first part of section 183c.' Therefore,
if the Limitation Act was construed as allowing forum selection clauses,
then it would be impossible to find that COGSA section 1303(8)
prohibits forum selection clauses as well.
18'
175. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Scherk
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1
(1972).
176. Cf. New York Convention, supra note 56.
177. See BriefAmicus Curiae of American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity
Association at 9, Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322 (1994)
(No. 94-623).
178. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c (1994).
179. § 183c; see supra note 79.
180. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c; see supra note 79.
181. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c; see supra note 79.
Washington Law Review
The Court distinguishes between substantive and procedural rights.182
The Court correctly points out that if travel costs are enough to lessen a
carrier's liability, then foreign arbitration or forum selection clauses
within certain jurisdictions in the United States should also be forbidden
because a claimant from Seattle would incur travel expenses to arbitrate
or litigate in New York. 3 Conversely, a claimant from Seattle would
incur fewer travel expenses if the bill of lading stipulated arbitration in
Vancouver, Canada.
To a great extent, however, procedural rights have just as much
importance as substantive rights. Most likely, small cargo owners will
not find it worthwhile to invest money on foreign arbitration when the
expenses of such arbitration exceed the value of the cargo. Although
insured cargo owners would generally recover from insurance
companies,'84 there could be circumstances where small cargo owners
will not insure their cargo. In most cases, however, insurance companies
would be the ones to pursue arbitration in foreign countries." 5 Most
likely, insurance companies would try to incur arbitration expenses all at
once by accumulating small claims until it added to a worthwhile
amount.
Some of the expenses involved in going to a foreign arbitration
include high arbitration fees, attorney fees, and basic travel.'86 These
expenses are not so unreasonable, however, as to lessen a carrier's
liability. London, England has customarily been the choice of forum due
to its historical maritime expertise. 7 As a result, carriers and shippers
have customarily chosen London even if it was inconvenient and
182. Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2327.
183. Id. at 2327-28.
184. It is the practice of cargo insurance companies to pay cargo owners immediately and file a
suit against the carriers as subrogees. In cargo damage disputes, the parties will often be the carrier
and the insurance company. See Gilmore & Black, supra note 4, at 190-91.
185. In maritime insurance contracts, there are subrogation clauses that may read:
The Underwriters shall be subrogated to all the rights which the Assured may have against any
other person or entity, in respect of any payment made under this Policy, to the extent of such
payment, and the Assured shall, upon the request of the Underwriters, execute and shall deliver
such instruments and papers as the Underwriters shall require and do whatever else is
necessary to secure such rights In the event of any agreement or act, past or future, by the
Assured, whereby any right of recovery of the Assured against any person cr entity is released
or lost to which the Underwriters on payment of loss would be entitled to subrogation, but for
such agreement or act, the Underwriters shall be relieved of liability under this Policy to the
extent that their rights of subrogation have been impaired thereby ....
2 Alex L. Parks, The Law and Practice ofMarine Insurance and Average app. 22, at 1331 (1987).
186. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 38(e) (1977).
187. Edgar Gold, Maritime Transport 72 (1981); see Gorton et al., supra note 85, at 129.
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expensive for them to arbitrate in England.' Although the potential for
abuse exists, carriers' choice of forum is not necessarily aimed at
inconveniencing cargo owners. The U.S. Supreme Court probably
decided Sky Reefer in light of the traditional practice of carriers and their
choice of forum. Arguably, the Court could be applying the custom of
arbitrating in London blindly. However, when considering the costs
involved in arbitrating in different parts of the United States, the cost of
foreign arbitration does not seem to be so unreasonable. In addition, any
type of arbitration or litigation will have its costs.
189
Although the Court treated the issue of whether foreign arbitrators
will apply COGSA as premature, COGSA and the Hague Rules are
essentially the same. The Japanese version of the Hague Rules provides
that if damages arise from the acts or omissions of the stevedores
employed by the shipper of goods, the carrier is not liable for damages
to the goods.'90 COGSA, on the other hand, holds the carrier solely
responsible for the stowing of carried goods.' 9 The Sky Reefer Court
correctly noted however that COGSA section 1304(2)(i) provides for a
defense in cases of any loss or damage to the goods arising from acts or
omissions of the shipper or any agent or representative of the shipper. 2
B. US. Law Should Adapt to the Changing International Maritime
Arena
It is clear that the MLA has cargo owners' interest in mind, but it is
also clear that the proposed revision is really an attempt to resuscitate
the U.S. maritime legal business that has been in decline for the last ten
years. 93 After the recent Sky Reefer decision, U.S. maritime lawyers will
see even less business. 4 Although concern for the U.S. legal business is
very persuasive, it is also important to realize that international events
are shaping commerce in a manner that requires the United States to
188. See Gold, supra note 187, at 72.
189. When it comes to litigation costs, the parties involved must pay for court charges, counsel
fees, interest losses, losses due to inflation, costs for and in connection with witnesses, etc. In most
countries, winning parties may get their attorneys fees reimbursed. In the United States, however,
courts do not award attorney's fees as a regular practice. See Gorton et al., supra note 85, at 127.
190. Hague Rules, supra note 24, app. 112, art. 3(1).
191. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(2) (1994).
192. Vimar Seguors y Reaseguors, S.A. v. MNV Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2329 (1995) (citing
46 U.S.C. app. § 1304(2Xi) (1994)).
193. See William Tetley, The "Sky Reefer" Hamburg Rules Address Jurisdiction, Fairplay, Oct.
1995, at 26, 26.
194. Id.
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discard its old suspicions of foreign courts and update its participation.
As one commentator notes, "English lawyers may be accused of being
behind the times .... [But] [i]t is... reassuring to note that in at least
one respect the Americans are behind... namely in the development of
their system of international arbitration law. 195 Without complete
participation, the United States is handicapped in its attempt to negotiate
and enforce international commercial agreements. As the Court in Sky
Reefer recognized, businesses once essentially local now function in
foreign markets.196 Logically, the Court stated that the general
skepticism against foreign arbitration "must give way to contemporary
principles of international comity and commercial practice." '97
C. The MLA 's Proposal Violates the New York Convention
Invalidation of foreign arbitration clauses contradicts the New York
Convention. Article 2(1) of the New York Convention states that each
contracting state shall recognize arbitration clauses.' 8 However, as
Justice Marshall stated, "[A]n Act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction
remains ... 2 9 Thus, when it is impossible to reconcile international
law and domestic law, a congressional act will preempt an earlier
international law.2" Courts traditionally do not favor complete
repudiation of international law unless Congress clearly demonstrates
that it intended to supersede the previous existing agreement.2"' As a
195. See Jonathan Goodliffe, United States Approach to Foreign Arbitration, Lloyd's List Int'l,
Aug. 5, 1995, at 8, 8.
196. Vimar Seguors y Reaseguors, SA. v. MN Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 232, 2328 (1995) (citing
M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972)).
197. Id. at 2328.
198. More specifically, article 2 states:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties
undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise
between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning
a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
New York Convention, supra note 56, art. 2(l); see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Iniernational Litigation
andArbitration 187 (1993).
199. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
200. Federal statutes do not "repeal" international law. It is incorrect to say that Congress has
the power to "repeal treaties." However, acting within its legislative authority under the
Constitution, Congress may enact laws that are inconsistent with international law. The courts will
give effect to the rule later in time. See Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and ;he Constitution 164,
413-14 (1972).
201. See Murray, 6 U.S. at 118.
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result, the proposed revision to COGSA section 1303(8) could be seen as
an exception to the New York Convention because the language of the
revision is restricted to cases where the loading and the discharging of
the goods take place in a U.S. port. 2 The MLA's proposed revision
does not prohibit the enforcement of foreign arbitration clauses in all
cases where COGSA is applicable. 3 Nonetheless, the United States will
not be relieved of its international obligations nor of the consequences of
violating such obligations.2°4 If Congress implements the proposed
revision to section 1303(8) of COGSA, the courts would be obligated to
enforce the revision, but the United States would be placed in an
awkward position when it came to its international responsibilities.
Upholding the Sky Reefer decision would not violate the New York
Convention; thus, the United States would not face international scorn.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE REASONS SUPPORTING THE MILA
PROPOSAL
One argument for adopting the MLA proposal is to ensure that cargo
owners will have the option to contract with U.S. carriers. A second
argument is that there is little guarantee that a foreign court will be able
to apply U.S. law in the same manner that U.S. courts would. Third,
there is an argument that U.S. carriers may purposefully want to
arbitrate in foreign countries.
A. Cargo Owners Are Not at the Mercy of Carriers
Proponents of the new revision argue that the Sky Reefer decision will
have severe detrimental effects. Some of the foreseeable effects of this
decision are that some big carrier companies may change their vessel
flags for foreign flags of convenience.2 5 Because U.S. carriers will
benefit from changing their flags, U.S. cargo owners will lose their only
chance of contracting with carriers that would choose American
202. See Maritime Law Ass'n, supra note 45, app. 1, at 14.
203. l1
204. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion on Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 44, at 22 (Feb. 4, 1932).
205. Recently, there has been a movement of major U.S. steamship companies such as Sea-Land
Services, Inc. and American President Cos. to document their new ships under foreign flags of
convenience and to redocument some of their existing ships. See Liz Atwood, Maritime Institute
Scratches for New Training Niche as U.S. Shipping Declines, Baltimore Sun, Jan. 6, 1994, at 7B.
As of 1990, 341 American ships have been sailing under foreign flags. See John McPhee, A
Reporter at Large: Looking for a Ship - I, New Yorker, Mar. 26, 1990, at 68.
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arbitration forums such as New York. United States carriers could
presumably be looking for a forum that is inconvenient to claimants, has
expensive arbitration fees, slow turn around, a tendency towards
favorable rulings for carriers, and applies favorable evidentiary rules.
Despite these possibilities, the Sky Reefer decision does not restrict
freedom of contract. Although bills of lading will be issued with the
arbitration clause already in place before the cargo owner or the shipper
has a chance to negotiate, cargo owners are not entirely at the mercy of
206carriers. The standard procedure for cargo owners to enter into a
contract with a carrier is to "place an order on the market."2"7 Cargo
owners will place this order with their shipbrokers who in turn will
circulate it to the carriers' brokers.08 Small cargo owners may have only
one or two brokers that act as their exclusive agents."' Because these
exclusive brokers will most likely be aware of the needs and concerns of
the cargo owner, it is very likely that the brokers will try to find the
carrier that is most beneficial to the cargo owner, especially when it
comes to arbitration clauses. Therefore, regardless of the: size and power
of cargo owners, bills of lading are not absolutely inflexible. Shippers
are not as powerless as they may seem. The United States has a strong
shipping interest group supplemented by powerful insurance
companies.210 In addition, because there is an oversupply of carriers,' it
is more likely that carriers will change their bills of lading in accordance
with shippers' desires in order to remain competitive.
Alternatively, a cargo owner could obtain a service contract from a
carrier and stipulate the United States as the only forum for dispute.1 2
However, this is only possible for big cargo owners such as Du Pont,
J.C. Penney, Sears, and Wal-Mart because they have equal footing with
206. See Gorton et al., supra note 85, at 21-24.
207. Id at 18.
208. Id A shipbroker is an intermediary through which the cargo owners and the carriers
negotiate. Shipbrokers are a source of information. They should be aware of the current market and
be able to give accurate advice on the status of the competition. Normally, shipbrokers do not have
the authority to finalize an agreement. However, shipbrokers have the duty 1:o participate actively
in the negotiations and to advise their respective employers. Id. at 28-29.
209. Id at 24.
210. See Leslie J. Buglass, Marine Insurance and General Average in the United States 3 (3d
ed. 1991).
211. It is predicted that the shipping market will enter into recession. Carriers will prefer to enter
into long term engagements and freight levels will decrease. Charterers will try to obtain lower
freight levels and as soon as freight start to increase the shipping market will collapse. See Gorton
et al., supra note 85, at 15.
212. Maritime Law Ass'n, supra note 45, at 54.
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carriers when it comes to bargaining power." 3 Consequently, smaller
companies would still find themselves in a more vulnerable position, but
they could also insist on service contracts from carriers through a trickle
down effect.
214
B. Foreign Arbitration Panels Will Not Handicap U.S. Cargo Owners
Another great point of contention is the issue of fair application of
law by the foreign arbitrators.1 5 Carriers could supposedly choose
forums depending on the arbitration panels that applied rules inherently
favorable to them. Arguably, differences in the civil and common law
tradition may bring forth decisions that are completely incompatible
with U.S. arbitrated decisions. In such instances, U.S. courts are open for
appeal when the law applied was inconsistent with COGSA.216 Although
appealing would increase costs, the avenue for remedy is still available.
Foreign arbitration panels, however, will probably not decide cases in
a manner that is extremely contrary to U.S. practice. Arbitration panels
are generally composed of three arbitrators, one of whom is an
umpire.217 It is a common principle of arbitration that each party
nominates one arbitrator, who in turn collaborate with each other by
nominating the umpire. 218 Because it is the parties themselves that
choose the arbitrators, it is logical that they will be choosing arbitrators
that have a history of favoring either carrier's or cargo owner's interests.
Therefore, one arbitrator will be inclined to favor carriers, the second,
cargo owners. The third arbitrator or umpire will probably be neutral
because the arbitrators make a joint effort in choosing the umpire.
Furthermore, because arbitration panels are an important part of
maritime commerce, 219 most maritime nations enforce arbitration
clauses." Thus, maritime arbitrators should be quite aware of the
national differences and the international effects of maritime treaties.
Also, it is improbable that foreign arbitrators will always apply the law
213. Robert Mottley, Beware offoreign arbitration, Am. Shipper, Mar. 1, 1996, at 52, 52.
214. Id.
215. See Vinar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2329-30
(1995).
216. New York Convention, supra note 56, art. 5.
217. Gorton et al., supra note 85, at 128.
218. Id.
219. Arbitration is often preferred due to the costs, the time, and the "secrecy" of the procedures.
The parties generally prefer not to solve their problems in a public proceeding. IaH at 129.
220. See Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2328.
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in a manner that is more favorable to carriers. Just as foreign arbitrators
may benefit carriers, they may also apply COGSA in a manner that is
stricter than U.S. courts would, thus benefiting cargo owners or shippers.
Similarly, there is no guarantee that every panel of U.S. arbitrators
would apply COGSA rules in the same manner. Therefore, cargo owners
should not fear that foreign arbitration panels will misapply the law and
only favor carriers because cargo owners are not at a complete
disadvantage.
C. U.S. Carriers Will Probably Not Want To Arbitrate in Foreign
Countries
The third reason supporting the MLA proposal is the claim that U.S.
carriers will intentionally include foreign countries as the situs for their
arbitration. In fact, carriers will probably not include a fbreign country
as their arbitration forum because carriers may be wary of choosing fora
not accustomed to applying COGSA.Y If the carrier was to choose a
forum that decided to enforce the Hague-Visby or the Hamburg Rules
and did not look favorably to the five hundred dollar package limitation,
then the carrier could be liable for more damages.'m Therefore, a carrier
is much better off in the United States, where COGSA's five hundred
dollar package limitation is enforced.
In addition, regarding rights to subpoena, if an accider.t that damaged
cargo occurred in the United States, then the carrier may be without
witnesses at trial because foreign arbitration forums have no right to
subpoena U.S. citizens.' Furthermore, once in foreign arbitration, the
plaintiff is not entitled to sue third parties responsible for certain
methods of carriage such as trucking companies, feeder vessels, and
barges.' Therefore, the carrier would be completely liable for damages
caused by other third parties. Carriers would probably not want to give
up the right to implead third party defendants. Consequently, carriers
will find it more beneficial to include the United States as their forum
rather than a foreign country.
The need to reverse "centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration
agreement" 5 and the need to participate harmoniously in the ever
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expanding international trade 6 overshadow any prejudiced view of the
United States' role as a leading country in international commercial
dealings. The Sky Reefer decision finally aligned U.S. commercial
practices with those of the rest of the world. The Sky Reefer Court, when
stating that opposition to arbitration and foreign forum selection clauses
"has little place in an era when... businesses once essentially local now
operate in world markets," ' 7 was making an observation that has long
been patent. Thus, reasons for the approval of the MLA proposal are not
compelling enough to preempt much more pressing needs.
VI. CONCLUSION
As a matter of protecting the maritime legal market, it would be
beneficial to confine arbitration within the United States. However, the
maritime legal market is only a small fraction of the total American
legal market. No substantial legislative change should be effectuated
merely to protect a small interest group. In addition, when considering
the unified direction that the international maritime commercial forum is
taking, it would be detrimental to the United States as a whole not to
participate in the changes. The Sky Reefer decision finally harmonized
U.S. law regarding arbitration clauses with that of the rest of the
international community. If Congress adopts the Maritime Law
Association's proposed revision of COGSA section 1303(8), Congress
would simply perpetuate a medieval approach to arbitration clauses that
has finally been provided an opportunity to change.
226. See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MNV Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322,2328 (1995).
227. Id (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972)).

